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Abstract
The number of comparative tax law studies is substantial.
The available literature on the methodology behind these
tax comparisons, however, is rather limited and underdevel-
oped. This article aims to contribute to the theoretical back-
ground of tax comparisons by explicating methodological
considerations in a comparative tax research on tax incen-
tives for cross-border donations and relating it to the availa-
ble methodological literature. Two aspects of tax law make
comparative research in tax law a challenging endeavour: its
complexity and fast-changing nature. To overcome these
issues, this article proposes to divide jurisdictions into a limi-
ted number of categories. In this process the different legal
levels are analysed systematically, resulting in categories of
jurisdictions. Among the jurisdictions in one category, com-
mon characteristics are identified. This results in an abstract
description of the category. I use the term ‘ideal types’ for
these categories. The high level of abstraction in the use of
ideal types allows for comparison of tax jurisdictions, with-
out the risk that the comparison gets outdated. An addition-
al advantage of working with ideal types is that the conclu-
sions of the comparison can be applied to all jurisdictions
that fit in the ideal type. This increases the generalisability of
the conclusions of the comparative tax research.
Keywords: Classification of jurisdictions, international com-
parative tax law, tax law methodology
1 Introduction
When researching tax law it is interesting to see how
different countries deal with one and the same issue.
Approaches can be very similar, but can also vary large-
ly. Comparing different jurisdictions gives an idea of
alternative measures to an issue. Usually, a legal com-
parison can provide insights into the political, social and
cultural climate in a country. Contrasting one’s own
jurisdiction with another also improves the understand-
ing of one’s own jurisdiction. For these and for other
reasons, many tax law scholars have engaged in tax law
comparisons.
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Also in the field of my research interest – tax incentives
for philanthropy in personal income tax – scholars have
conducted country comparisons.1 One of the findings of
the comparisons is that there is a high level of consensus
regarding the encouragement of philanthropy through
the tax system among high-income countries, as 87% of
high-income countries provide a tax incentive for dona-
tions by individual benefactors in personal income tax
acts.2 Despite this high level of consensus in domestic
situations, governments have far more diverging
approaches when it comes to cross-border situations.
Differences in approaches of governments towards the
application of tax incentives to cross-border philanthro-
py emerge in the comparisons made by several tax law
scholars. They analysed the impact of the developments
in EU law on the application of tax incentives for cross-
border donations. Furthermore, they compared the rele-
vant tax provisions on the use of tax incentives for cross-
border philanthropy of countries in and outside the
EU.3 Each of them, for obvious reasons, focused on a
limited number of countries. These studies demonstrate
that there are countries that restrict tax incentives for
charitable giving to the own country. Others allow for
tax incentives in personal income tax on cross-border
gifts. The conditions under which a tax incentive for a
cross-border gift can be obtained, however, vary largely
and the full range of requirements passes by, from strin-
gent requirements to limited requirements.
1. For recent comparisons see, among others, S. Heidenbauer, ‘Exclusive-
ness and Directness in Charity Law: A Comparison’, 25 Steuer und
Wirtschaft International 283 (2015); F. Vanistendael (ed.), Taxation of
Charities (2015): and Nexus, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Charities
Aid Foundation, Rules to Give by: A Global Philanthropy Legal Envi-
ronment Index (2014).
2. Nexus, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Charities Aid Foundation, above
n. 2. High income economies are those with a Gross National Income
per capita of $12.736 or more, World Bank, ‘New Country Classifica-
tions by Income Level’, available at: <http:// data. worldbank. org/ news/
new -country -classifications -2015> (last visited 17 July 2015).
3. See, among others, H. Jochum and A. Savvaidou, ‘Deduction of Gifts
and Contributions and Other Tax Incentives in the PIT and CIT for Non-
Profit Entities or Activities’, in F. Vanistendael (ed.), Taxation of Chari-
ties (2015) 61; T. von Hippel, Cross-Border Philanthropy in Europe
after Persche and Stauffer: From Landlock to Non-Discrimination?
(2014); S. Heidenbauer, S.J.C. Hemels, B.W. Muehlmann, M. Stewart,
O. Thömmes & T. Tukić, ‘Cross-Border Charitable Giving and Its Tax
Limitations’, 67 Bulletin for International Taxation 611 (2013); M.
Stewart, ‘Tax Deductibility of Cross-Border Giving: Australia Gives No
Quarter’, Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper 605 (2012), S. Hei-
denbauer, Charity Crossing Borders, the Fundamental Freedoms’ Influ-
ence on Charity and Donor Taxation in Europe (2011); and I.A. Koele,
International Taxation of Philanthropy (2007).
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The example of tax incentives for cross-border philan-
thropy demonstrates that countries with a similar
approach towards domestic situations can have diver-
gent approaches to the same topic in cross-border situa-
tions. Comparison of these different approaches towards
cross-border taxation, similarly to the comparison of
domestic tax law, provides interesting insights. Con-
ducting a comparative tax law research, however, can be
challenging. In other legal areas one can rely on the
available methodological literature when engaging in
comparative research. The literature on comparative tax
law, however, is rather sparse and fragmented. Compa-
rative tax law studies either lacked a description of their
methodological approaches or started from scratch and
failed to engage with the comparative tax research con-
ducted by others.4 By making the method that I used
explicit and relating it to other methodological contribu-
tions, this article aims to contribute to the methodologi-
cal understanding of comparative tax law, more specifi-
cally to the comparison of measures for cross-border
taxation. Furthermore, the newly developed guidelines
used during the classification of tax jurisdictions are put
forward. This seems worthwhile since few scholars have
made their methodology explicit. It is an invitation to
others to make their methodology in comparative tax
law explicit as well, in order to strengthen the field of
comparative tax law.
The categorisation of tax jurisdictions took place in the
light of a study I conducted on tax incentives in personal
income tax for cross-border charitable gifts.5 Through
the analysis of the relevant tax sources, I classified tax
jurisdictions into ideal types that capture the spectrum
of different approaches governments hold towards the
application of tax incentives in cross-border situations.
The ideal types vary from jurisdictions that support
cross-border donations with a tax incentive, to govern-
ments that restrict tax incentives to domestic donations
and models that represent the more moderate
approaches between these extremes.
The article starts with a brief description of the status of
comparative tax law within comparative law in Section
2. Section 3 identifies two main challenges that arise
when comparing legislation on cross-border taxation,
namely the complexity of tax systems and the rapid leg-
islative change. The article continues with the descrip-
tion of the method I have used to compare countries’
approaches towards tax incentives for cross-border phi-
lanthropy in Section 4. Special attention is paid to the
classification of tax jurisdictions. Section 5 reflects on
the use of ideal types in comparative tax law. In the last
section I make some concluding remarks. Although the
central aim of this article is to advance the methodology
of comparative tax law, the discussion may be helpful
for the study of cross-border legislation in other legal
fields as well.
4. O.Y. Marian, ‘The Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law’, 58 The
American Journal of Comparative Law 415 (2010).
5. R. Buijze, Charitable Fundraising for the Arts in the Era of Globaliza-
tion: International Tax Barriers for Arts Organizations, forthcoming
PhD thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
2 Comparative Law and
Comparative Tax Law
2.1 Comparative Law and Comparative Tax
Law
It may indeed be that the mere interpretation of posi-
tive rules of law in the way traditionally practised by
lawyers does not deserve to be called a science at all,
whether intellectual or social. Perhaps legal studies
only become truly scientific when they rise above the
actual rules of any national system, as happens in
legal philosophy, legal history, the sociology of law,
and comparative law.6
This provocative statement by Zweigert and Kötz stim-
ulates the reflection on traditional legal research. It
shows that the discipline of law can benefit from
approaches that go beyond the study of the national sys-
tem. At the same time, it depicts that comparative law
gains value when it goes beyond the study of foreign law
and does not run ashore at the descriptive comparative
law of country reports. Instead, these informative
descriptions constitute the starting point for a critical
comparative reflection on the phenomenon studied.
Comparative law is one method to go beyond the study
of national legal systems. It has the potential to obtain a
more profound understanding of law that is less directed
to national legal systems and more targeted to overarch-
ing approaches and/or deeper underlying principles.
Comparative research allows scholars to identify gener-
al, universal applicable legal principles. It allows them to
understand, organise and structure law. And it allows
the discovery of model solutions for preventing or
resolving conflicts.7 Comparative law, however, is not
an aim in itself. Instead, it is a method that provides a
structure to find an answer to a research question.8
The discipline of comparative law came into being
around the turn of the previous century. The first con-
ference on comparative law was held in 1900 in Paris.9
Since then, many scholars have written on the method-
ology of comparing jurisdictions, although they do not
perceive comparative law as a full-grown methodology.10
By comparative tax law, I refer to the methods used in
comparative law applied to the field of tax law. Some
scholars argue that comparative tax law is not just a
6. K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (1998),
at 4.
7. H.P. Glenn, ‘The Aims of Comparative Law’, in J.M. Smits (ed.), Elgar
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2012) 65 and Zweigert and Kötz,
above n. 6, at 4, 15.
8. Glenn, above n. 7, at 65 and W. Devroe, Rechtsvergelijking in een
Context van Europeanisering en Globalisering (2010), at 37, 38.
9. V. Heutger and E. Schrage, ‘Legal History and Comparative Law’, in
J.M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2012) 505, at
512.
10. Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 6, at 33.
190
ELR December 2016 | No. 4 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000071
methodology, but a substantive body of knowledge.11 I
agree with their line of reasoning that the methodology
used is mainly a technique derived from comparative
law and can lead to new knowledge in itself. In this arti-
cle, however, I would like to focus on the former: the
methodological contribution the approach and techni-
ques of comparative tax law make to the discipline of tax
law. Therefore, I address comparative tax law as a meth-
odology in this article.
Comparative tax law has developed somewhat in isola-
tion of comparative law in general, for two reasons. First
of all, the emphasis in traditional comparative law used
to be on private law. Key works on comparative law,
until recently, did not address legal comparisons in tax
law, although they paid attention to other fields of law,
such as contract law, tort law, family law and, more
recently, areas in public law, such as administrative law
and constitutional law.12 Second, owing to the high level
of specialisation in tax law, tax specialists are usually the
ones conducting comparative tax law instead of legal
comparatists.
Comparisons are of great importance, though, in the
field of tax law. Civil servants and practitioners who
negotiate or apply tax treaties, for instance, need to have
knowledge of one or more foreign jurisdictions in order
to understand and apply the treaty. The increasing inte-
gration of supranational legislation with domestic tax
law demands more knowledge of comparative tax law as
well. In the EU, this is caused by the harmonisation of
indirect taxes and the harmonisation on sub-areas of
direct taxes. Furthermore, there is no other area in law
for which the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) has produced as much jurisprudence as for tax
law, which requires amendments of national tax legisla-
tion.
The importance of comparative tax law for practice has
put its mark on comparative tax law in academia. Most
of the research in this field is pragmatic. Moreover, it is
often descriptive in nature, describing the legal practice
on a specific topic in a selection of jurisdictions. In cases
where it is more analytic, the emphasis in the research is
often on one single country. When considering the
importance of comparative tax law for practice13 and the
large number of tax scholars who engage in compari-
sons,14 it is surprising that relatively little has been writ-
ten on the methodology of comparative tax law. Tax law
is notoriously fast changing and complex, which makes
the comparison of tax law a challenging endeavour.
Therefore, methodological guidance is important for tax
law comparatists.
11. R.S. Avi-Yonah, N. Sartori, & O. Marion, Global Perspectives on
Income Taxation Law (2011), at 1-2 chapter 2 and Marian, above n. 4,
at 421.
12. See, amongst others, Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 6; P.G. Monetary
(ed.), Methods of Comparative Law (2012) and M. Adams and J.
Bomhoff, Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (2012).
13. V. Thuronyi, ‘Tax Law’, in J.M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Com-
parative Law (2012) 867.
14. Ibid.
2.2 Methodology in Comparative Tax Law
The methodology of comparative law is rather young
and develops by trial and error.15 This definitely holds
for comparative tax law. Tax law scholars for a long time
omitted to contribute to methodology shaping. Not that
there was a total absence of methodological literature,
but the majority of tax law comparatists started from
scratch in developing their method and omitted to take
the work of others into account. Furthermore, they
omitted to explicate how they got to the used methodol-
ogy after earlier attempts. This resulted in largely vary-
ing, sometimes even conflicting, but underdeveloped
methodology for comparative tax law and a lack of com-
parative tax discourse,16 and made it difficult to learn
from one another. A conversion is going on, however.
Marian, for example, related existing comparative tax
law research to the methodological framework of com-
parative tax law.17 By doing so he contributed to the
methodology, or discourse as he calls it, of comparative
tax law. I believe this is an important step, since compa-
rative legal methods have a lot to offer to the discipline
of tax law.
Comparative legal methods have the potential to con-
tribute to the field of tax law in several ways. Through
comparison with other tax jurisdictions, comparative tax
law allows for a better understanding of the own
system.18 It stimulates scholars to think creatively about
legal problems and broadens their perception of the
technical available measures to achieve a certain policy
goal.19 When designing new legislation, comparative tax
law can provide inspiration and it can identify best prac-
tices and threats to the success of potential new legisla-
tion. Furthermore, it can be used to add structure to the
field of tax law, which can be used in further research.
Besides, comparative tax law can help gain an under-
standing of the legal context.20 Finally, it is relevant for
practice. It gives insight into the underlying differences
between jurisdictions, which is necessary, for example,
to manage cross-border transactions.
2.3 Different Kinds of Comparative Tax Law
The degree and type of comparative research conducted
in tax law differ largely. There is comparative tax law
that provides analytical comparisons, where compari-
sons of national systems are made within a specific
assessment framework. This type of comparative tax law
is normative and/or evaluative. An example of meth-
odological explanation of comparative tax law that uses
15. Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 6 at 33 and W. Twining, Globalization and
Comparative Law (2000) at 191-92.
16. Marian, above n. 4, at 417.
17. Ibid.
18. W.B. Barker, ‘Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law to Promote
Democratic Policy: The Example of the Move to Capital Gains Taxation
in Post-Apartheid South Africa’, 109 Penn State Law Review 703, at
708 (2004-2005) and H.J. Ault and M.A. Glendon, ‘The Importance of
Comparative Law in Legal Education: United States Goals and Methods
of Legal Comparisons’, 27 Journal of Legal Education 599, at 601
(1975).
19. H.J. Ault and B.J. Arnold, Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural
Analysis (2004) and Ault and Glendon, above n. 18.
20. V. Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law (2003).
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an assessment framework to make an analytical compari-
son is the work of Barker.21 He made a critical analysis
of the South African capital gains tax in comparison
with that in the United Kingdom and the United States,
in order to assess how the tax system can help solve eco-
nomic inequality in an emerging democracy. Barker is of
the opinion that comparative tax law should go beyond
mere description and should be critical. He states:
‘Comparative analysis needs to confront the assump-
tions underlying tax law including its effect, efficiency,
fairness, and acceptance by the people. This means it
must go beyond descriptive focus on the “is” and evalu-
ate the “is” in the terms of the “ought to be.”’22 Another
interesting example that strives for the “ought to be”
through a tax law comparison is the study by Infanti.23
Infanti conducted research on the tax treatment of
cross-border contributions to charities, just as I did. He,
however, uses the comparative tax law method to dem-
onstrate how –according to his presumption – simplifi-
cation of the domestic tax regime can be achieved
through tax coordination at the international level.
Moreover, there is research that makes comparisons
based not on a normative assessment framework, but on
the characteristics of the tax jurisdiction. This type of
comparison aims not to evaluate, but to structure tax
jurisdictions. The structure in itself can be seen as a
result and helps gain insight into tax jurisdictions out-
side the own jurisdiction. What is more important, per-
haps, is that the created structure can assist in answering
more explanatory, predictive and defining research
questions. Ault and Arnold, in their canonical work,
created a structure along which they could discuss the
income taxation of nine industrialised countries.24
Unfortunately, these authors pay little attention to the
theory underlying their comparison. The research in
which I categorise high-income countries according to
their approach towards the application of tax incentives
for cross-border donations is a similar type of compari-
son. By explicating the used methodology, my work is
aimed at providing insight into this type of tax law com-
parison.
Finally, a large part of the comparative tax law literature
is descriptive in nature. Tax law scholars have written
highly informative descriptions on the legislation in a
specific field of tax law in their jurisdictions. Examples
are country reports, which are bundled into edited vol-
umes. These publications are very helpful for practi-
tioners and academics that search for an introduction to
a foreign tax jurisdiction. Tax legislation is complex,
and therefore country reports are a very welcome start-
ing point from which to get a basic understanding of a
foreign jurisdiction. The purpose of these overviews is
mainly informative, which is exactly why they are help-
ful to tax comparatists. On the other hand, some schol-
21. Barker, above n. 18
22. Ibid., at 708.
23. A.C. Infanti, ‘Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On Adopting a Compara-
tive Approach to Reforming the U.S. International Tax Regime’, 35
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1105 (2002).
24. Ault and Arnold, above n. 19.
ars might question whether they belong to comparative
tax law in the narrow sense, since it misses a normative
approach or does not produce a body of knowledge.25
When a summary of the national reports is added to the
edited volume, trends might be identified.26 This, again,
is perceived as comparative tax law by the majority of
scholars.
3 Challenges in Comparative
Tax Research on Cross-
Border Taxation: A Complex
and Fast-Moving Target
Comparative tax law research is complicated by three
aspects of tax law: rapid legislative change, the complex-
ity of tax systems and the heterogeneity of local tax con-
cepts.27 These challenges present in comparative tax
research also appear, and are perhaps even more pro-
nounced, when comparing topics in the field of cross-
border taxation. The heterogeneity of local concepts,
however, appears in many fields of comparative law and
is discussed extensively by others.28 Therefore, I will
only mention that the translation of foreign tax concepts
requires great caution and that one should be aware of
the different meanings of seemingly similar concepts.29
The other two factors, however, do require some
explanation.
Comparative research on tax legislation is complicated
by continuous political pressure and changing govern-
ment standpoints. This results in ongoing changes in tax
legislation over time. For instance, the requirements for
Algemeen Nut Beogende Instellingen (Public Benefit Pur-
suing Entities) in the Netherlands have changed five
times between 2008 and 2014.30 When dealing with
cross-border issues, one has to take into account
(changes in) legislation in two countries. Political
changes and decisions at the international level also add
to the rapid pace of changes in tax law. The case law of
the CJEU, for example, is a source of amendments to
national law. This makes tax law, especially cross-bor-
der taxation, a fast-moving target that is difficult to
grasp and poses the risk of comparative tax research get-
ting outdated fast.
25. C. Garbarino, ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation:
Methods and Agenda for Research’, 57 The American Journal of Com-
parative Law 667, at 679 (2009).
26. Marian, above n. 4, at 455-56.
27. Garbarino, above n. 25, at 686-88.
28. See, among others, L. Hantrais, International Comparative Research,
Theory, Methods and Practice (2009) at 72-94; G.R. de Groot and
C.J.P. van Laer, ‘The Dubious Quality of Legal Dictionaries’, 34 Interna-
tional Journal of Legal Information 65 (2006).
29. See, among others, Garbarino, above n. 25, at 686-88; M.A. Living-
ston, ‘Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes and Limits of
Comparative Tax’, 18 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 119
(2005).
30. S.J.C. Hemels and W. van Vliet, ‘Anbi: regeling of ontregeling?’ 17 Vak-
blad Fondsenwerving 27 (2015).
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Another challenge in comparative tax research is to deal
with the complex nature of tax law, especially in cross-
border situations. The complexity of tax law stems from
its distinctive tax vocabulary. Furthermore, the high
degree of refinement in the tax provisions, which might
be laid down in a large volume of varying legal sources,
adds to the complex structure of tax law.31 This com-
plexity causes a high level of specialisation among schol-
ars and practitioners. In several OECD countries, for
example, specialisation in the field of tax law is the norm
and generalists are exceptional.32 The impact of nation-
al, international and/or supranational legislation on each
other further adds to the degree of complexity of tax
law, especially on cross-border tax issues. It provokes a
‘vertical comparison’, which is a comparison that com-
pares legal systems at different legal levels.33 A compari-
son that checks whether a tax system of an EU Member
State is in line with the four fundamental freedoms as
stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU) would be an example.34 So unlike
the traditional horizontal comparison, which is a com-
parison occurring among systems belonging to the same
level,35 comparisons of (cross-border) taxation provoke
both horizontal and vertical comparisons. Furthermore,
in some cases an unequal comparison might arise
because some countries have larger sovereign powers
than others.
The foregoing factors make it difficult to get a hold on
one’s own tax jurisdiction, let alone fully understanding
multiple tax jurisdictions. The boundaries between legal
orders, expressed in horizontal and vertical relations, get
blurred owing to the integration of legal orders.36 At the
same time, the large impact that legislation at the inter-
national and/or supranational level has on national leg-
islation and vice versa increases the demand for compa-
rative tax law. As Thuronyi nicely puts it: “EU integra-
tion fuels some of the demand for comparative tax law
knowledge.”37
To overcome the challenges that the fast-changing and
complex nature of international tax law pose to compa-
rative tax law, I propose a method for comparative tax
law that categorises tax jurisdictions into ideal types.
The benefits of this method are that it enables a system-
atic analysis of tax jurisdictions in their international
legal context and that it provides durable outcomes.
Besides, the ideal types enable generalisation of the con-
clusions to other countries. In the next section I explain
how the tax jurisdictions are categorised into ideal types,
so that other researchers can reflect on this method
when engaging in similar comparative tax law research.
31. Livingston, above n. 29, at 120; Thuronyi, above n. 20, at 17-20.
32. Thuronyi, above n. 13, at 863.
33. A. Momirov and A. Naudé Fourie, ‘Vertical Comparative Law Methods:
Tools for Conceptualising the International Rule of Law’, 2 Erasmus Law
Review 291 (2009).
34. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and EU Treaty
(as amended through 2007).
35. Momirov and Naudé Fourie, above n. 33.
36. Devroe, above n. 8, at 37-56.
37. Thuronyi, above n. 13, at 862.
4 The Comparison of
Approaches to Tax
Incentives for Cross-Border
Philanthropy
4.1 Conducting Comparative Legal Research
Zweigert and Kötz distinguish the following five steps
in conducting comparative research: (a) definition of the
research topic and research question; (b) selection and
interpretation of sources; (c) selection of countries; (d)
comparison of the country reports and (e) building of a
system.38 Other comparative law scholars like Kamba
and Örücü provide similar guidelines for conducting
comparative law, albeit with slightly different
emphasis.39 Infanti, who also conducted research on the
tax treatment of cross-border contributions to charities,
adopted the guidelines proposed by Kamba.40 Although
we study the same topic, the different aims of our com-
parative tax law research, logically, direct me to a differ-
ent approach. Whereas Infanti’s work aims to develop a
method that achieves simplification of the domestic tax
regime through tax coordination at the international lev-
el, my research aims to explore the different approaches
towards the application of tax incentives for cross-bor-
der donations. It is the steps identified by Zweigert and
Kötz that I largely drew on in the comparison of
approaches to tax incentives for cross-border philan-
thropy.
The comparative tax law research in which I explore the
different approaches towards the application of tax
incentives on cross-border donations is part of a larger
research project that evaluates the solutions that allow
private donors to benefit from the domestic tax incen-
tive for donations on cross-border donations. This spe-
cific topic determines the scope of the comparison: a
specific facility in personal income tax, and thus a micro
comparison.41
The starting point of the actual research was the explo-
ration of the literature on cross-border charitable giving.
This exploration led to the main research question:
‘What are the dominant approaches towards the applica-
tion of tax incentives in personal income tax for cross-
border individual giving?’ In line with Zweigert and
Kötz advice, I kept away from terms related to a specific
jurisdiction. Instead, I selected a concept that grasps the
functionality of the rules I wanted to study. I chose the
term ‘tax incentives’ instead of ‘tax credit’, ‘tax deduc-
tion’ and the like, because the latter refer to measures
used in specific jurisdictions, whereas the former covers
38. Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 6, at 32-47.
39. W.J. Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’, 23 Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly 485 (1974); A.E. Örücü, ‘Meth-
odology of Comparative Law’, in J.M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law (2012) 560.
40. Infanti, above n. 23.
41. Marian, above n. 4, at 449-51.
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the entire category of measures that support charitable
giving through the income tax system.
For the exploratory research, I consulted scientific arti-
cles by tax law scholars from a diversity of countries.
This provided a good idea of the primary sources to
consult for the actual research. Although I had initially
considered the comparison of domestic tax legislation
and a separate discussion of international and suprana-
tional legislation, I soon learned that this was insuffi-
cient. Domestic tax legislation, bilateral tax treaties and
supranational agreements all had to be taken into
account in the comparison. During the data collection I
thus searched for information relevant to tax incentives
for charitable giving in all these three sources. The
advantage of studying a tax benefit is that these benefits
are generally well described in the written law. This is
in contrast to other types of provisions, where unwritten
rules might be present that can be difficult to track
down for non-native scholars. The great consensus
among high-income countries in regard to the applica-
tion of tax incentives for charitable giving helped me a
great deal in finding the relevant provisions in the legis-
lation.
In addition to the written law, important case law was
studied. This was initially limited to case law of courts
at the international level such as the CJEU. Later, when
it showed that in one jurisdiction written law was not in
line with the CJEU case law and there was uncertainty
about the law in practice, clarification was found in the
case law of the highest tax.
To gain insight into the application of domestic tax law,
in the first instance the original documents were consul-
ted. But when language barriers forced consultation of
secondary sources, I turned to respectable secondary
sources, and explicitly noted in the reports wherever
applicable that they were based on secondary sources.42
Even though translations of the original documents
were available, caution was required since certain con-
cepts are difficult to translate. Besides, similar concepts
can have a different meaning, owing to the influence of
the socio-cultural context in a country.
The exploratory research included a broad variety of
jurisdictions. For the actual research, the initial selec-
tion of jurisdictions had to be limited. Zweigert and
Kötz propose two approaches for the selection of juris-
dictions: (a) selecting jurisdictions from different legal
families or (b) selecting on the basis of the function of
the topic in the research.43 I chose the latter, as I wanted
to ensure that a variety of approaches towards the appli-
cation of tax incentives for cross-border philanthropy
were included in the research. In the exploratory
42. Respectable secondary sources were used in case language barriers pre-
vented consultation of original legislation, such as the Tax Research
Platform of IBFD (<http:// online. ibfd. org>) country reports gathered by
the European Foundation Centre and Transnational Giving Europe
(<www. efc. be/ programmes_ services/ resources/ Pages/ Legal -and -fiscal -
country -profiles. aspx> and <www. transnationalgiving. eu/ en/ country -
profiles/ >), the Council on Foundations (<www. cof. org>) and the pub-
lication following the 2012 Conference of European Tax Law Professors
(F. Vanistendael (ed.), Taxation of Charities (2015)).
43. Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 4, at 40-42.
research I had identified the main varieties of tax incen-
tives for philanthropy. The exploratory research also
provided insight into the relevant legal orders that influ-
ence the approaches governments hold towards the
application of tax incentives for cross-border philan-
thropy. These factors were guiding in the selection of
jurisdictions, in order to ensure that the existing diversi-
ty of jurisdictions would be represented in the selection.
On the basis of this purposeful selection I chose the fol-
lowing jurisdictions: Australia, Barbados, Belgium,
France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
This selection of jurisdictions includes examples of the
entire spectrum of approaches towards the application
of tax incentives on cross-border philanthropy. Addi-
tional countries would closely resemble one of the juris-
dictions included in the selection and would therefore
not foresee new insights. In other words, I had reached
the point of decreasing marginal returns.44 Since the
research focuses on a very specific provision, it was fea-
sible to study this rather large selection of jurisdictions.
This would, for obvious reasons, be impossible if the
research topic encompassed a more general rule.
Despite using a purposeful selection, unintendedly the
selected jurisdictions cover most of the tax law families
as identified by Thuronyi.45 Barbados, Australia and the
United Kingdom represent the Commonwealth family;
the United States represents the American family; the
French family is covered by France; Hungary belongs to
the transition and post-conflict family; the Netherlands,
Belgium, Germany and Sweden represent the Northern
European family; Spain belongs to the Southern Euro-
pean family; and Japan represents the Japanese/Korean
family. The families identified by Thuronyi that are not
covered by this selection are the Latin American family
and the miscellaneous family. None of the countries in
the miscellaneous family are high-income countries and
therefore fall outside my comparison. Among the Latin
American family, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Vene-
zuela qualify as high-income countries, and the latter
three also seem to have a tax incentive for private giving
in place.46 The existing literature on cross-border chari-
table giving did not give rise to including these coun-
tries in the selection, although for the future it might be
interesting to have a closer look at (one of) these coun-
tries.
For each of the twelve selected jurisdictions I made a
brief country report. In order to enlarge the reliability of
my interpretation of the sources consulted I cross-
checked my findings with academic articles by native
scholars of the relevant jurisdictions, in so far as these
were available. To make the country reports compara-
ble, I had to use an approach to all jurisdictions that
would allow me to eliminate the elements that are pecu-
liar to a jurisdiction, but stand in the way of compari-
son. These elements are, for example, tax concepts spe-
44. Ibid., at 41.
45. Thuronyi, above n. 20, at 23-44.
46. Nexus, McDermott, Will & Emery, Charities Aid Foundation, above n. 2.
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cific to one jurisdiction and cultural interpretations. To
eliminate these, I followed the functional approach.
This commonly used approach in comparative law,
which is also adopted in comparative tax law, assumes
that the basic function of legislation in each country can
be compared. It starts from a specific problem and then
examines which mechanisms are used in the jurisdic-
tions studied to resolve it. The mechanisms for each
function can then be grouped on the basis of the func-
tion.47 My method differs from the functional approach
in later steps, where the functional approach searches
for similarities in tax legislation and is used as a tool “for
reform leading to harmonization or even unification of tax
laws”.48 Instead, my aim is not to reform tax law, but to
map the different legislative models. Here I find my
approach close to that of Thuronyi, who sees compara-
tive tax law as an instrument that provides a structure
for reference in tax law.49 Besides, I did not focus solely
on the similarities, but also took into account the differ-
ences between jurisdictions.
While constructing the country reports, similarities and
differences between countries started to become clear. I
could see patterns crystallising, and that is how I got to
the division of jurisdictions into ideal types. However,
before describing the categorisation of jurisdictions in
the next section, a word of caution is necessary.
Although categorisation is helpful as a system, the dis-
cussion of tax law in terms of ideal types does come with
some drawbacks. As in every legal comparison, there are
the language barriers to overcome.50 Furthermore, juris-
dictions are heavily interrelated with the societal and
cultural background of the country.51 In addition, one
should look not only at the written law, but also at the
law in action.52 Therefore, getting a thorough under-
standing of a jurisdiction other than that in your home
country can be difficult. One should be aware, when
engaging in comparative tax law, that systems might
seem the same but the institutional and cultural back-
grounds might differ.53 This can be a threat to a suc-
cessful comparison. With the help of work by native
scholars and the support of generous reviewers and col-
leagues, however, it is possible to get a grip on a foreign
legal system.
4.2 Categorisation Regarding Tax Incentives for
Cross-Border Gifts
The relation between the different legal levels and the
level of openness of a country towards the application of
tax incentives for cross-border philanthropy showed to
be the key to a system based on which the different
approaches could be divided into ideal types. According
to Zweigert and Kötz, this ‘system building’ is the last
47. Garbarino, above n. 25, at 688.
48. Marian, above n. 4, at 438.
49. Thuronyi, above n. 20, at 2.
50. Devroe, above n. 8, at 50-3; de Groot and van Laer, above n. 28.
51. Devroe, above n. 8, Acco (2010), at 44; Thuronyi, above n. 20, at
23-25.
52. Barker, above n. 18, at 723-24.
53. Ault and Arnold, above n. 19.
step in comparative research,54 as the division into ideal
types enables a macro-perspective on a specific and
detailed topic. Based on the type of tax incentive availa-
ble, the availability of legal measures at different legal
levels and the requirements imposed on qualifying don-
ations, I built a system in which the jurisdictions can be
ordered in a meaningful sequence. This requires some
explanation. In the next paragraph I elaborate on the
relevant factors.
At the national level countries choose a specific tax
incentive scheme, such as a credit on taxes due, a deduc-
tion from taxable income or a percentage designation
scheme. In principle, these tax incentives can all be
applied in cross-border situations. Countries grant tax
incentives in cross-border situations under certain con-
ditions. They can allow for a tax incentive on direct
cross-border donations or on cross-border donations
through a local intermediary charity. The local interme-
diary charity is a qualifying charity in the country of the
donor that receives the gift and then transfers it to a for-
eign charitable organisation. Since the transaction from
the donor to the local intermediary charity is a donation
to a domestic qualifying organisation, a tax incentive is
granted on the gift. Obviously, a country that allows for
direct cross-border donations has a more open approach
than countries that only allow for tax incentives on indi-
rect cross-border donations.
Through the design of the tax incentive and the require-
ments imposed on a qualifying donation, governments
can nuance the application of the tax incentive. The
requirements can vary from administrative require-
ments, to requirements on the location of the designated
organisation, to definitions on what activities qualify as
charitable and requirements over the control over the
receiving charity. The requirements imposed on quali-
fying donations are a strong tool to limit or loosen the
applicability of tax incentives to cross-border donations,
for countries that allow for tax incentives on cross-bor-
der donations based on national legislation, but also for
countries that allow this based on international and/or
supranational legislation. The more requirements and
the stricter the requirements imposed on a qualifying
donation, the more difficult it is to make a cross-border
donation with the benefit of a tax incentive, and thus the
more closed a jurisdiction is on this issue.
At the international level, countries can engage in bilat-
eral tax treaties in which they recognise each other’s
charities and mutually apply their tax incentives to
cross-border donations. The more bilateral tax treaties a
country has that include a provision on charitable con-
tributions, the more open the approach of a country is.
Also at the supranational legal level, countries can
engage in agreements on this topic. In the European
Union (EU), for example, the CJEU in the Persche case
ruled that based on the free movement of capital, dona-
tions to charitable organisations that meet the charity
requirements of the donor’s state should be treated
equally, regardless of whether it concerns a donation
54. Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 6, at 44-46.
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within an EU Member State or crossing borders
between two EU Member States or an EU Member
State and a country that is part of the European Eco-
nomic Area.55 EU Member States that want to limit the
scope of this judgment can alter their national legislation
in such a way that the requirements on qualifying dona-
tions become restrictive, as long as they stay within the
limits of the Persche case.
The factors that influence the applicability of a tax
incentive for cross-border donations, described in this
section, are measures at different legal levels that are
guiding in the comparison and ranking of tax jurisdic-
tions according to their openness towards the applica-
tion of tax incentives for cross-border donations. The
road map in the next section summarises this in a more
structured manner. Applying this road map results in
four ideal types: (1) closed jurisdictions; (2) restrictive
jurisdictions; (3) relatively open jurisdictions and (4)
open jurisdictions. These ideal types inform us how
open a jurisdiction is towards the application of a tax
incentive on a charitable gift. Countries without a tax
incentive in place at the domestic level fall outside the
comparison.
Although the jurisdictions could have been divided into
a different number of categories, four ideal types
showed to be the right number, as these four ideal types
summarise the spectrum of different approaches gov-
ernments hold towards the application of tax incentives
for cross-border philanthropy. While developing the
system, I also made an attempt to divide the jurisdic-
tions into three and five ideal types. Three ideal types
did not allow inclusion of all the factors discussed above.
More than four ideal types forced a divide on less mean-
ingful components and would have made it more com-
plex to deal with the categories.
4.3 Categorisation of Jurisdictions: A Road
Map56
The categorisation of the jurisdictions into ideal types
was done as systematically as possible, in order to
increase the internal validity. The following steps were
taken:
1. Does the domestic tax legislation allow for tax incen-
tives on direct cross-border donations? If yes, > ideal
type (4) open jurisdiction.
2. Does the domestic tax legislation allow for tax incen-
tives on indirect cross-border donations (through a
local intermediary charity) and/or does the country
have international agreements, such as tax treaties
and/or supranational agreements, that allow for tax
incentives on cross-border donations
a. with at least ten countries? And
b. of which the facts and circumstances make it prac-
tically possible to obtain a tax benefit on a cross-
55. CJEU, 14 October 2008, Case C-318/07, Hein Persche v. Finanzamt
Lüdenscheid.
56. In this section I cite my own work to illustrate the application of the
method I propose in this article. See R. Buijze, ‘Approaches Towards the
Application of Tax Incentives for Cross-Border Philanthropy’, 44 (1)
Intertax (2016).
border situation? If yes> ideal type (3) relatively
open jurisdictions.
3. Does the country have international agreements, but
with less than ten countries, and/or are the facts and
circumstances such that it is impossible to obtain a
tax benefit for a cross-border donation in practice? If
yes> ideal type (2) restrictive jurisdiction.
4. None of the above? If yes> ideal type (1) closed juris-
dictions.
4.4 Four Approaches towards the Application of
Tax Incentives for Cross-Border Gifts
Based on the road map above, the different jurisdictions
were divided into four categories that summarise the
spectrum of the different approaches governments hold
towards the application of tax incentives for cross-bor-
der donations. A last step to take was to identify the
common qualities of each category, in order to define
the four ideal types. To identify these characteristics, I
went back again to the country reports, but this time to
search for similarities within the jurisdictions that
belong to one category. I described the ideal types as fol-
lows.57
Countries that stimulate charitable gifts through tax
incentives in the domestic situation but not in a cross-
border situation are considered closed tax jurisdictions.
In their tax system, these countries provide a benefit to
benefactors of charity organisations, for example,
through a tax credit or deduction from taxable income.
Closed jurisdictions, however, do not have domestic leg-
islation that allows for a tax benefit for cross-border
donations, nor do they have bilateral or supranational
agreements with other countries on tax incentives for
cross-border donations. Examples of these countries are
Australia and Japan.
At present, countries that use a tax designation scheme
(also known as percentage schemes) typically also belong
to this ideal type. The majority of jurisdictions that
apply a tax designation scheme to support philanthropy
limit tax incentives on philanthropy to donations in the
own country, although it is technically possible to allow
for cross-border donations in a tax designation scheme.
The tax designation schemes are designed such that tax-
payers in their tax declaration can allocate a percentage
of their taxes due to a charity that is included in a list of
eligible charities. In this list often solely domestic chari-
ties are included. Since the gift to the charity is made
through the tax declaration, it is difficult for the taxpay-
er to have a say in the spending of the contribution.
This limits the possibility to use the recipient charity as
an intermediary charity. Currently, most of the jurisdic-
tions that use a tax designation scheme have a closed
approach towards the application of tax incentives for
cross-border charitable giving. This, however, is not
inherent to tax designation schemes, but to how a spe-
cific jurisdiction adopts this tax designation scheme.
57. In the following paragraphs I cite my own research to illustrate the out-
come of the method I propose. In the article I cite from, however, this
text belongs to the core content of the research. See Buijze, above n.
56.
196
ELR December 2016 | No. 4 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000071
Hungary is one of the countries in the EU that uses a
tax designation scheme and that I consider a closed tax
jurisdiction.
In restrictive jurisdictions a tax incentive can be
obtained for cross-border donations, based on bilateral
tax treaties or supranational agreements. However, the
scope of these agreements is limited, allowing for tax
incentives on cross-border donations with no more than
ten countries. Owing to the limited scope of the agree-
ments these jurisdictions are considered restrictive.
Furthermore, countries with more agreements, but
where it is practically cumbersome to receive a tax bene-
fit, are included in this ideal type. I add this criterion to
avoid that those countries where it is legally possible but
practically close to impossible to receive a tax benefit on
a cross-border donation, to end up in the relatively open
category. For example, EU Member States need to
allow for tax incentives in cross-border situations. How-
ever, in practice it proves to be extremely difficult in
some Member States to obtain this benefit, since EU
law based on the TFEU and CJEU case law is simply
not applied. These jurisdictions try to restrict the tax
incentives to the domestic situation as much as possible
and are therefore effectively in the category ‘restrictive
jurisdictions’. A local intermediary organisation might
provide a solution in this type of jurisdictions to obtain a
tax incentive for cross-border donations. Examples of
these jurisdictions are the United Kingdom, France and
Spain.
A more moderate category are the relatively open tax
jurisdictions, which do allow for tax incentives on cross-
border donations, but mainly based on tax treaties and
supranational agreements. The scope of these agree-
ments is rather broad and covers more than ten coun-
tries. Furthermore, the facts and circumstances make it
practically feasible to obtain a tax benefit on a cross-bor-
der donation. Besides, in these countries it is also possi-
ble to obtain a tax incentive for a cross-border donation
through local intermediary charities. Belgium, Germany
and the United States are examples of this ideal type.
Open tax jurisdictions are those countries that allow for
tax incentives on cross-border donations, based on
domestic tax regulations. They do so in cross-border sit-
uations with multiple countries. Regardless of whether
donations are made domestically or internationally, tax
privileges can be obtained. Thus, there is no discrimina-
tion between donations made to domestic charities and
those made to foreign charities. In both cases the donor
receives the same tax privilege. The Netherlands, Bar-
bados and Sweden fit within this ideal type.
5 Reflections on the
Categorisation into Ideal
Types
Many scholars propose that only a limited number of
jurisdictions can be compared, because of the available
resources, accessibility to sources and time limitations. I
subscribe to these claims. However, this greatly limits
the generalisability of the findings of the research, since
the legal comparison will only hold for the discussed
jurisdictions. Under the most favourable conditions it
can be cross-checked whether the conclusions drawn
from the legal comparison can also apply to another
jurisdiction. But this, of course, requires a full analysis
of the additional jurisdiction. By limiting oneself to a
small selection of countries, comparisons can get bogged
down in studies that inform us on the current legal sit-
uation in the discussed jurisdictions and their differen-
ces and similarities. Although the informative value of
these studies should not be underestimated, it does have
limitations. Furthermore, a comparison of a small num-
ber of jurisdictions is not generalisable over time. As
soon as legislation changes, the comparison is outdated,
and thus the conclusions are largely obsolete.
To contribute to fundamental scientific knowledge, it is
desirable to have more abstract findings, so that they can
be applied to other jurisdictions. This is exactly what
the categorisation I propose has to offer. Working with
ideal types allows for conclusions at a higher level of
abstraction. This stimulates conceptualisation and helps
reveal relations within tax legislation. Findings can be
generalised to other jurisdictions geographically, but
also over time. Jurisdictions are not static, so if legisla-
tion is adjusted, it is sufficient to check whether the
changes impact the categorisation of the jurisdiction. If
necessary, the jurisdiction can be shifted to a different
ideal type.
Although presented here in the light of cross-border
taxation, the method might be of use to cross-border
issues in other fields of law. The prerequisite is, though,
that the approach can be grasped in an ordinal discrete
variable, e.g. a qualitative measure that can be ordered in
a meaningful sequence. Furthermore, this ranking of
approaches has to be related to the different legal levels
it is subject to. Another prerequisite to apply the meth-
od used here is that there is a certain degree of conver-
gence among jurisdictions studied.
Distilling four ideal types that summarise the spectrum
of approaches towards the application of tax incentives
for cross-border donations, based on the analysis of
twelve jurisdictions was possible because of the great
convergence between different jurisdictions, despite the
fact that each country’s tax laws are unique.58 Several
causes are conceivable for this great coherence. Jurisdic-
tions can belong to the same legal family, which are
groups of jurisdictions characterised by their style of
legal thought.59 Another reason might be that govern-
ments adopt successful laws from other countries. This
practice is known as legal transplants.60
In the field of cross-border charitable giving, countries
might also look at each other for successful measures at
different legal levels to restrict or open their jurisdiction
58. Thuronyi, above n. 20, at 15-17.
59. Barker, above n. 18, at 711.
60. Ibid., at 716.
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towards the application of tax incentives for cross-bor-
der donations. This would explain why it was possible
to clearly identify four different ideal types. This brings
me to the similarities between the categorisation of tax
jurisdictions I propose with that of the ‘typological
method’ of legal comparisons.
The typological method is a variation of the functional
method, which was briefly addressed in Section 4. In
the functional method, law is studied in practice,
according to its function. The typological method builds
on this by searching for a solution to a specific problem
in the different judicial systems around the world, the
so-called wholesale approach. Solutions to the problem
are distilled from jurisdictions, and from these specific
solutions, type-solutions are identified. Type-solutions
are model solutions under which the other solutions can
be classified. The type-solutions are the base for a
divide of jurisdictions in different categories of groups
of solutions. These groups can intersect legal families.61
In the categorisation I propose, the type-solutions can
be found in the different legal levels. Each different
legal level provides a different type-solution that allows
for the application of tax incentives on cross-border phi-
lanthropy. Based on these type-solutions, the different
approaches towards the application of tax incentives are
classified and indeed these groups do intersect legal
families.
The congruence we see in the approaches of govern-
ments towards legal issues is also helpful for compara-
tists to assess the quality of the comparison. It helps to
evaluate whether a broad enough scope was taken. If
only few different approaches are found, one can won-
der whether the researcher included enough jurisdic-
tions. On the other hand, the researcher can be confi-
dent that his or her study is complete if the addition of
jurisdictions does not lead to additional categories.62
Categorising jurisdictions into ideal types, however, is
not suitable for every aim. In the discussion of tax juris-
dictions in terms of ideal types, the peculiarities and
nuances that every jurisdiction has are lost to a large
extent. Therefore, the method proposed is not suitable
when one aims at drawing conclusions for a specific
jurisdiction. Detailed analysis of the jurisdiction con-
cerned is necessary to draw conclusions for a specific
jurisdiction. The aim of the ideal types is to achieve a
certain level of abstraction and not to reach out towards
specific jurisdictions. Although no conclusions can be
drawn for one specific jurisdiction, a lot can be learned
when using this approach. As Thuronyi writes:
Doing meaningful comparative analysis is especially
difficult in the tax area, where political pressure,
chance and historical accident have all had an impor-
tant influence on the development of the systems.
However, with appropriate caveats and cautions,
there is much to learn in the tax field from a compa-
rative analysis of common problems. One need not
61. Devroe, above n. 8, at 37-56.
62. Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 20, at 39-40.
believe in the existence of a Platonic Tax Form to
find useful insights in the experience of others.63
6 Concluding Remarks
Comparative law methods can contribute to the field of
tax law. It provides tools to gain a profound understand-
ing of tax law, it uncovers universal applicable legal
principles and helps to identify model solutions. For
these and other reasons, tax law scholars have engaged
in comparative tax law. Few of them, though, have
made their methodology explicit, and among those who
have explicated their method the majority failed to
relate it to the methodology used by other tax law com-
paratists.
To contribute to the methodology of comparative tax
law, this article elaborated on comparative research, spe-
cifically focusing on cross-border tax issues, the chal-
lenges involved and how to overcome these challenges.
The two main challenges specific to comparative tax law
on cross-border tax issues are the fast-changing nature
of tax legislation and the complexity involved in cross-
border tax issues because of the different legal levels
involved.
To overcome these two issues in a study of the different
approaches towards the application of tax incentives for
cross-border donations, I developed a technique in
which jurisdictions are categorised into ideal types. In
essence, the categorisation takes place on the basis of
measures available at the different legal levels to which
the jurisdiction is subject and which resolve the cross-
border tax issue. Through this method, categories are
developed in which each country receives a ranking
based on which it can be assigned to an ideal type.
By creating ideal types the model increases the compa-
rability of jurisdictions regarding cross-border taxation.
This results in a structured overview of the broad range
of approaches towards international tax law. Once the
ideal types are established, determining the position of
one specific jurisdiction in the broad range of tax juris-
dictions becomes more straightforward. This makes it
easier to deal with changes in legislation. The method
thus allows for easy expansion of the countries studied
and is resistant to the dynamic nature of tax legislation.
Besides, the use of ideal types allows for generalisation
beyond the study of one specific jurisdiction. It enables
a broader generalisation of findings.
The ideal types in themselves contain a body of knowl-
edge. They provide an overview of different approaches
towards a cross-border tax issue. However, they can also
be used as the starting point for further research into
more specific issues. One could, for example, analyse
the legal measures a taxpayer can rely on in one of the
ideal types and see which of the available measures sol-
ves a cross-border issue most effectively and efficiently.
63. Thuronyi, above n. 20, at xxii.
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